Abstract. There are numerous methods of achieving -differential privacy (DP). The question is what is the appropriate value of , since there is no common agreement on a "sufficiently small" , and its goodness depends on the query as well as the data. In this paper, we show how to compute that corresponds to δ, defined as the adversary's advantage in probability of guessing some specific property of the output. The attacker's goal can be stated as Boolean expression over guessing particular attributes, possibly within some precision. The attributes combined in this way should be independent. We assume that both the input and the output distributions have corresponding probability density functions, or probability mass functions.
Introduction
Computing queries on statistical databases inevitably leaks something about the underlying data, even if only an aggregated output is observed. Differential privacy [3] (DP) quantifies privacy losses coming from such queries, and estimates accumulation of the losses if several queries are made to the same data. Roughly speaking, DP says that, if two databases are sufficiently similar, then the attacker should not be able (up to certain extent, parametrized by ≥ 0) to distinguish between them by observing the query output. If the outputs are numeric, DP is commonly achieved by adding calibrated noise to them. The smaller is, the larger is the noise magnitude, and the higher is privacy.
While cryptographic security parameters are in general well-understandable, it is not so easy with DP. In general, there is no upper bound on , and we cannot tell in advance how small is "good enough". Suppose that we have come up with some fixed 0 to conceal the change in a numeric attribute of an input table (let us denote it x) by 1. The number 1 is a very abstract value, and we need to know what it means in reality. For example, if x is population size, then 1 is a very small change that may be not worth of hiding, and if x ∈ [0, 1] is a probability, then 1 would cover the entire space of inputs x. In the first case, we may want to enhance the privacy and require that e.g. change ∆ = 1000 should be untrackable. With respect to the new metric, we get exactly the same level of differential privacy for = 0 · 1000 = 0.001 · 0 . We see that we cannot define in advance "sufficiently good" .
Intuitively, in the last example we have linked goodness of to the underlying metric, so we should consider together with the metric to define its goodness. We want to convert these two quantities to a single estimate that would be more standard and easier to interpret. In this paper, we show how to relate the metric and the to attacker's advantage in guessing a particular attribute.
Related Work
Differential privacy was first introduced by Dwork [3] . Numerous follow-up papers show how to achieve it for certain types of queries and database metric [1, 5, 2, 8, 7, 4] . PINQ [13] is probably the most famous example of a worked-out framework that provides privacy-preserving replies to database queries.
This work is mainly motivated by [11] , which is one of the few papers mentioning the way of choosing appropriate , relating it to the difference in attacker's prior (before observing the output) and posterior (after observing the output) knowledge about the input data. Since of DP may be difficult to interpret, there also exist alternative definitions of DP like Pufferfish privacy [9] or Differential identifiability [12] . In this paper, similarly to [11] , we are staying within standard definition of DP and do not consider alternative definitions.
The results of [11] have been briefly mentioned in [10] , being generalized from Laplace noise to arbitrary DP mechanisms, showing its potential usefulness to non-standard database metric. In this paper, we formalize these initial results, extend them, and provide technical details of applying it in practice. In general, we can use a system that supports non-standard metrics (like [10] ) to estimate the amount of noise. For some particular cases like filtering by a discrete attribute, we get standard metric, so we can utilize obtained e.g. directly in PINQ system.
Guessing Advantage and Differential Privacy

Definition of Guessing Advantage
We start from the attacker model of [11] , where the attacker advantage is defined as the difference between its prior and posterior beliefs on the property that he is guessing. While [11] is based on Laplace noise distribution, the analysis developed in [10] is based on generalized Cauchy distribution, for which it is more difficult to compute precise bounds. In this paper we work with more general bounds, which can be derived directly from the definition of differential privacy, without relying on the specific privacy mechanism.
First, let us give some definitions that we will use in this chapter.
. Hence, if we want Pr post [X ] ≤ Pr pre [X ] + δ, we need to take 
To satisfy |Pr post [X ] − Pr pre [X ]| ≤ δ, we eventually need to take = min( lb , ub ) .
Note that, if p ≤ 1 − p, then lb ≤ ub , and if 1 − p ≤ p, then ub ≤ lb . Hence, we do not need to compute both bounds.
Constraining the search space The problem of this approach is that R can be very large in practice, or even not exist. Note that we are essentially trying to prove that the elements of X are "sufficiently indistinguishable" from the elements of X \ X . In practice, it may be sufficient to take just a subset of X ⊆ X \ X and show that it is difficult to distinguish X andX . We have
If R := sup x∈X,x ∈X d(x, x ) does not exist, then we may instead take a such that Pr[x | ∀x ∈ X : d(x, x ) ≤ a] ≈ 1, which is useful e.g. when the input comes from normal distribution. It is possible that there are better candidates for a. A method to choose optimal a for a uniformly distributed attribute is given in App. A, but we do not have a generic approach for this. In practice, if there is R such that Pr[x | ∀x ∈ X : d(x, x ) ≤ R] ≈ 1, since computing from a is a cheap operation, we may sample several different values of a from the interval (0, R], and take one for which is the largest, i.e. noise is the smallest.
Instantiation to databases
As in [10] , we assume that a database is an element of a Banach space X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ). In general, n is the total number of variables defining the database. While it seems the most intuitive to think that each X i corresponds to some cell of a table in the database, it is possible that X i in turn denotes a subspace of variables, i.e. a row or a column.
Let q : X → Y be a query. Let the noised query M q be differentially private variant of q. Let X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ), and let X i be the component that the attacker wants to guess (e.g. a subset of table columns). Let us constrain Def. 4 and take g(x) = x k and e(x) = (x 1 , . . . , x k−1 , x k+1 , . . . , x n ). Defining guessing advantage w.r.t. component, will be related to Def 2 of DP w.r.t. component.
Definition 5.
[Guessing advantage w.r.t. component] Let x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ (X 1 , . . . , X n ) be the data instance, M q (x) the observation. We say that advantage of guessing x k with precision r k is at most δ if
Formally, there is a collection S = {S k | k ∈ [|S|]} of sets of sensitive attributes that the attacker wants to guess. Each S k ∈ S is of the form S k = {(x k1 , r k1 ), . . . , (x kn k , r kn k )}, denoting the set of variables x i that are not allowed to be disclosed to the attacker with precision at least r i . All the attributes of S k define one disclosure, i.e., the attacker needs to guess all x i in order to win.
The Univariate Case
First, we show how to compute the for a single set S k ∈ S, where S k = {(t, r)} is univariate. The set of "sufficiently correct guesses" is defined as
As discussed in Sec. 3.2, to achieve
It is more complicated with defining a for Pr post [X ] ≥ Pr pre [X ] − δ, as the elements inside X \ X can already be R units apart from each other.
It can be reasonable to adjust Def. 5 and deliberately reduce the search space of the attacker, taking X := X ∪X a . Formally, we increase the knowledge of the attacker and add to e(x) the information that the input is located insidê X a . Note that we do not rescale the prior Pr pre [X ], but just "squeeze" the remaining probability weight so that Pr pre [X a ] := Pr pre [X \ X ]. As the result, we now only claim that the prior and the posterior distributions are different for x such that d(x, t) ≤ a. This allows to consider distances up to a. 
and Pr pre [X a ] = g(a) − g(r). Let us investigate some special cases of g(z). We also see whether we are able to make any reasonable analysis if prior probabilities are not known in advance, and we look more precisely at discrete datasets.
Uniform distribution. Given a radius r and an upper bound R on d(x, x ), it is easy to compute Pr pre [X ] = 2r R . For a < R, we can as well take g(a) = 2a R . This is true of we can perfectly fitX a into X. The problem is that the input t may be located not in the "center" of the space X, but somewhere in the corner, as shown in Figure 1 . It may happen that we cannot come up with a setX a with probability weight 2(a−r) R that would satisfy d(x, x ) ≤ a for all x ∈X a and x ∈ X , and need to include more distant points intoX a . We may have distance up to d(x, x ) ≤ 2a for x ∈ X , x ∈X a , which means that 2 will go to the exponent of e. To avoid the change in exponent, we can just take a := 2a, getting Pr pre [X ] = Distributions with well-defined cumulative distribution function (CDF). We can estimate noise for normally distributed inputs, and in general for data with well-defined CDF F (x). Namely, since we define g(z) = {x|d(x, t) ≤ z}, then by definition of CDF we get
If we are not given an upper bound R on X, then we can still derive some R based on the distribution. If the distribution has bell shape, it does not make sense to consider elements that are too far from the center. For example, for normal distribution N (µ, σ 2 ) we can take R = µ + 3 · √ 2σ, which covers erf (3) ≈ 0.9999779 of the input space and is more than enough.
The worst prior probability. Even if the input distribution is unknown, we can still define Pr pre [X ] in such a way that the maximum noise will be needed, so that our analysis would be valid for any possible prior. This value is non-trivial, e.g. although p = 1.0 increases posterior probability the most, the advantage would be 0. We want to find p that maximizes
We can do it by using common calculus. We have df dp
and we have df dp (p) = 0 for p = 1−δ 2 . Is it reasonable to try out a < R if the input distribution is unknown? In general, if we have no additional knowledge, we only know that g(R) = 1. Alternatively, if we do know that g(a) = q for some q, then we can take q − p instead of 1 − p. For example, even if we do not know details of the input distribution, if it is known that most of the data stays within some R < R, and Pr pre [x | d(t, x) ≤ R ] = q, it can be useful to give take a := R .
The question is how to choose the worst-case p. Substituting 1 − p with g(a) − p, we get df dp
and we have df dp (p) = 0 for p =
. This is in general different from the q = 1 case. However, note that in practice it is fine to consider only the case q = 1. If we have found p that minimizes in the case a = R, this is in any case sufficient. The aim of taking a < R is only to check whether it is possible to come up with a better . Hence, we can always take p = 1−δ 2 .
A discrete set of prior probabilities. Suppose that the possible value of x may come from the set of values {x 1 , . . . , x n } with probabilities {p 1 , . . . , p n } respectively (
. Here x is not necessarily a single attribute, and the set {p 1 , . . . , p n } may be computed from all possible combinations of several attributes, which in this case are allowed to be correlated.
If we have access to the actual data, then we may just look at the actual t and take p = p k such that t = x k , which guarantees that the analysis will be linear w.r.t, the number of table rows. Without having access to the actual data (which may happen if global sensitivity is used to enforce DP), we would need to make a theoretical estimate. We need to take the worst p k to ensure that each row is protected. If n ≤ ∞, we can do it for each p k one by one, but it is not computationally reasonable. Instead, we may start directly from p k that leaks the most. In the previous paragraph we have shown that the worst case is p = 1 1+e − /2 . This value itself may be missing from {p 1 , . . . , p n }. However, since the function f (p) has exactly one local maximum at p and is monotone at (−∞, p ] and [p , ∞), the values p l and p r that are closest to p from left and right respectively are the worst cases. It suffices to compute only for these two values, and take the smallest one.
The Multivariate Case: AND-events
Let us compute the for a single set S k ∈ S, where S k = {(t 1 , r 1 ), . . . , (t n , r n )}. Assume that there is an upper bound R i on each dimension. The univariate case can be generalized to multivariate, treating X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ) as a single vector variable, taking t = (t 1 , . . . , t n ), r = (r 1 , . . . , r n ), R = (R 1 , . . . , R n ). For this, we need to clarify how the distance in X should be defined. If it is an p norm of underlying dimensions, we will have d(t, x) = ||t 1 − x 1 , . . . , t n − x n || p . According to our intuition, the attacker wins if he guesses correctly a point from the rectangle
Hence, in general we take p = ∞. In some cases, we may as well be interested in other value of p, e.g. if t 1 and t 2 are coordinates of geographic location, then p = 2 corresponds more to our intuition.
In Sec. 3.2, the numbers r and a are single numbers, and not vectors. In general, we should take R = ||R|| p , r = ||r|| p and a = ||a|| p . However, it is not clear how to come up with a in the first place. First of all, let us scale all dimensions to get r := r i = r j for all i, j, which allows us to define a single r. E.g. take r = 1 and scale all R i accordingly. We can now optimize a based on this r. Still, as the scaled R i can be different, the same value a might not fit into every dimension. Optimizing a multivariate function by trying out all
. . , N }} is too expensive. Hence, we first sample r < a ≤ R, which we will use for distance. We will need particular a i to compute the probability weights g(a i ), and we take a i = min(a, R i ).
In Sec. 4.1, we have shown how to compute g(z i ) for one-dimensional z i . Assuming that the variables are independent, we can compute g(z) = i g(z i ) for an AND-event. If the variables are not independent, then there will be some special way of defining g(z), which depends on the distribution. The relations between variables can make only certain combinations of (a 1 , . . . , a n ) possible. However, since a i are only used in g(a i ) anyway, it suffices to work with a only. Thus, a subspace of correlated variables would be no different from the univariate case, and the probability distribution over that subspace should be given in advance.
The discussion above can be summarized into Theorem 1.
, where X i are pairwise independent, and
. . , t n ) be the actual data, and let
Let M q be an -DP mechanism w.r.t. norm ||x 1 , . . . , x n || ∞ . To bound the guessing advantage of X by δ, we need to take
where a i is a freely chosen value satisfying r i < a i ≤ R i , and a = ||a 1 , . . . , a n || ∞ .
The Multivariate Case: OR-events
There are two ways to define guessing advantage for entire S = {S k | k ∈ [|S|]}:
1. Each S k ∈ S is protected independently. E.g. if we have two uniformly distributed binary variables, then advantage δ = 10% means that the probability of guessing increases from 50% to 60% for any of these variables. For each S k ∈ S, we need to satisfy Def. 5 with X k = {x | j x ij ≤ r ij }. The suitable for differential privacy noise can be found as described in Sec. 4.1 (for univariate case) and Sec. 4.2 (for multivariate case). We take the maximum of obtained noise magnitudes, which is sufficient to protect each subset of sensitive attributes of S. 2. Alternatively, we can estimate the probability that the attacker guesses at least one set of sensitive attributes. This poses a different question for an OR condition, and the prior probability gets completely different meaning. E.g. if we have two uniformly distributed binary variables, we will have 75% of correct and 25% of incorrect guesses, and δ = 10% means that the probability of guessing at least one of these two increases from 75% to 85%. This approach assumes X j = {x| k j x ij ≤ r ij } in Def. 5.
Variant (1) is based purely on results of Sec. 4.1 and Sec. 4.2. In this section, we show how to deal with variant (2).
It is easier to estimate approximation of an AND of conditions, since the set X is bounded by r i at the coordinate X i , and d(x, x ) ≤ r = ||r 1 , . . . , r n || p for all x, x ∈ X. However, if the attacker wants to guess an OR of conditions, then he may guess x i correctly even if some other variable x j is as far from the actual value t j as possible, and we may only claim that d(x, x ) ≤ R = ||R 1 , . . . , R n || ∞ . A comparison of AND and OR sets is depicted in Figure 2a .
If we take a i = R i for all i, then the only difference of an OR-event from an AND-event is the construction of Pr pre [X ] . We have
Let us see what happens if we want to use a i < R i . Now the problem is that we may have d(x, x ) > a for x, x ∈ X , as the distances inside X are not bounded by r. We need to approach it differently.
Let
Let t = (t 1 , . . . , t n ) be the actual datapoint.
We split both X andX into the same number of blocks. The idea is that each block X k of X would have a sufficiently close unique neighbour blockX k inX . Let a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ), and a = 2 ||a 1 , . . . , a n || ∞ . First, we define
We also define
, where L depends on the size of the total space X. All blocks are pairwise disjoint, and X 0 ∪ ,k X k = X . An example of splitting into blocks is given in Figure 2b .
The constructed pairs enjoy the following important properties:
2. We have
..,an)−gt((a1−1,...,an−1))) gt((a1−1,...,an−1))
..,r k ,...,an) g t (a1,...,a k ,...,an)−g t (a1,...,r k ,...,an) , where t = (t 1 +2 1 ·a 1 , . . . , t k , . . . , t n +2 n ·a n ). Assuming that the variables are independent, this equals
(a) The area of correctly guessing AND and OR of two approximations
into easily comparable blocks
We will now analyze
. By property (1), d(x, x ) ≤ a, so -DP gives
Similarly, for k ∈ [n], ∈ L, we have
Let α = max k∈{0,1,...,n} α k . We get
The final result depends on l = argmax k∈[n] α k .
1. Let l = 0. By property (2), we have .
Applying Equation 1, we get some 0 .
2. Let l = k = 0. By property (3), we have
for any ∈ L. Applying Equation 1, we get some k .
We take = min k∈{0,1,...,n} ( k ). This shows that, in addition to protecting each dimension separately, we also need to take care of the a 1 × · · · × a n block surrounding the actual input t. We emphasize that it holds only for independent variables, as otherwise we cannot treat different k values independently.
The discussion above can be summarized into Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. Let X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ), where X i are pairwise independent, and
. Let M q be an -DP mechanism w.r.t. norm ||x 1 , . . . , x n || ∞ . To bound the guessing advantage of X by δ, we need to take = min k∈{0,1,...,n} ( k ), where
where a i is a freely chosen value satisfying r i ≤ a i ≤ R i , and a = ||a 1 , . . . , a n || ∞ .
Queries with Multiple Outputs
The results of Sec 4.2 and Sec. 4.3 do not depend on the definition of the set of outputs q(X). They only tell which is needed to satisfy the desired guessing advantage, and our task is to come up with a mechanism achieving this . If there are multiple outputs, we can use the standard notions of parallel and sequential composition.
Theorem 3 (Sequential composition [14] ). Let q(x) = (q 1 (x) ∈ R, . . . , q m (x) ∈ R). Let DP mechanism be such that, for all i
for all subsets Y ⊆ R m .
Parallel composition of DP says that we can take max( i ) instead of sum if the variables used by different queries are independent. Roughly speaking, the independence of inputs ensures that the condition d(t, t ) = 1 affects at most one of the outputs. We can generalize this result using the notion of p -norms.
Theorem 4. Let q(x 1 , . . . , x n ) = (q 1 (x 1 ) ∈ R, . . . , q m (x m ) ∈ R). Let the distance d(x, x ) for x, x ∈ R m be defined as an p -norm. Let a privacy mechanism M qi be i -differentially-private. Then, the mechanism M q = (M q1 , . . . , M qm ) is q ( 1 , . . . , m )-differentially-private, where q is the dual norm of p .
Proof. Let d(x, x ) ≤ 1, and let Y = (Y 1 , . . . , Y n ) ⊆ R m be arbitrary. We have x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ). For an p -norm, denoting Since (d 1 , . . . , d m ) is one candidate for z in this expression, we have
The most intuitive instantiations for Theorem 4 are the cases of 1 and ∞ norms, where d(x, x ) is an integer value, such as the number of rows. These will give us parallel and sequential compositions. In the case of 1 -norm, d(x, x ) = 1 means that exactly one of the inputs x i will change by 1, so it is sufficient to take max i i to protect from one change. In the case of ∞ -norm, d(x, x ) = 1 means that each input x i may change by 1, so we need to protect all the outputs at once, getting i i .
We can use Theorem 4 to find appropriate partitionings to i , which are not unique, and the partitioning may be optimized in such a way that the error would be minimal, i.e. reserve larger i for more sensitive q i . Finding the optimal partitioning is a possible direction for future research. If the queries are similar (e.g. groups of a GROUP BY query), then the best option is to assign the same value to all i .
Examples
Discrete data
Assume that we have a data table cat. Each cat can be male or female, and has one of the five main colors. We want to count all female tabby cats.
SELECT COUNT(*) FROM cat WHERE gender='F' AND color='tabby';
Define the distance between two databases as 1 iff the gender or the color are different. Such distance is subsumed standard DP metric, as every tabby female is viewed as an included record, and every other combination as excluded ,and sensitivity of a COUNT query w.r.t. this metric is 1, similarly to sensitivity of a COUNT query w.r.t. standard DP metric. Hence, the query could be executed with obtained in PINQ system. We need to define some prior or the distributions of genders and colors. Let gender be distributed uniformly, and let colors be distributed as 
OR-event.
Let us now assume that the attacker wins if he guesses either gender or color. This is equivalent to 'not guessing both in a wrong way'. We can write the set of possible correct answers as As sensitivity of COUNT query w.r.t. proposed metric is 1, using Laplace mechanism (described e.g. in [3] ), it would be sufficient to add Laplace noise with scaling parameter λ = 1/0.539 ≈ 1.86 for the AND-event, and 1/0.402 ≈ 2.49 for the OR-event.
Continuous data with univariate approximation
Assume that we have a data table employee. Each of the employees has some fixed salary, and we want to find the total employer expenses.
SELECT SUM(salary) FROM employee;
Assume that the attacker wins if he guesses someone's salary with precision of r = 100 currency units. For prior, let us assume that the salary of each employee is distributed normally according to N (µ = 2000, σ 2 = 55556) (so σ ≈ 235.7), i.e. While = 0.0038 seems extremely small, note that such would ensure a very strong definition of differential privacy, where neighbour tables are defined as being a = 200 units apart. Alternatively, we could rescale the entire space e.g. by a = 200, getting = 0.767. Such ensures differential privacy for neighbour databases defined as differing in 1 unit. Since each currency unit contributes 1 unit to the sum, the sensitivity of the query w.r.t. latter distance is 1. Laplace noise with scaling 1/ ≈ 1.3 is sufficient to ensure the guessing advantage below 0.1, and the noise level is comparable to example of Sec. 6.1. We see that dividing by 200 is fine since we are just working with different magnitudes. Also, such a SUM query would have larger output than a COUNT query (for a similar number of rows), so the noise would have less impact than in example of Sec. 6.1.
Continuous data with multivariate approximation
Assume that we have a data table ship. Each ship has some geographic location and certain maximum speed. At some moment, the ships start sailing with their maximum speed towards the port located at the point (0, 0). We want to know when the first ship arrives at the port. Using the operator <@> for geographical distance, which is essentially 2 -norm, the query looks like SELECT MIN((POINT(ship.x,ship.y)<@>(0,0))/ship.speed) FROM ship;
Assume that the attacker wins if he guesses some ship's location with precision of r = 10 units w.r.t. 2 -norm. Let the prior be defined as the distribution of distances from the point (0, 0), which is N (µ = 0, σ 2 = 1250) (so σ ≈ 35.4), i.e. Pr[(x, y) ∈ (−150, 150)] ≈ erf (3) ≈ 0.99998. Note that the variables x and y do not need to be independent, as we work with their joint distribution directly.
Let (t x , t y ) be the actual location of a ship. Differently from Sec. 6.2, we can find only a lower bound v . This will not affect the minimum if that ship was not among the first ones, but in the worst case the query output will also change by 1 v as well. Let v be the minimal speed of a ship, e.g. v = 1, so that the query sensitivity would be 1 similarly to the previous examples. Laplace noise with scaling 1/ ≈ 0.8 is sufficient to ensure the guessing advantage below 0.1.
The noise level seems less than in Sec. 6.2. But is it much or few? This depends on the magnitude of query outputs. While the same noise level could be small for SUM and COUNT queries on large tables, it could be worse for a MIN-query where the output itself is a small quantity. To estimate the goodness of noise, we need the actual data, and instead of absolute error estimate the relative error as done e.g. in [10] .
Conclusion
We have shown how to convert guessing advantage to epsilon. We see from some examples that the proposed method can give us reasonable noise.
While we have shown how to work with -DP, there exist alternative definitions. Relations between ( , δ)-DP and the guessing advantage are considered in App. B. The proposed approach is tightly bound to a particular DP mechanism, and we do not have generic results for ( , δ)-DP. Extending it to some more general constructions would be an interesting future work. A Optimizing the radius of elements that we want to make indistinguishable from the input Let us assume that the inputs are distributed uniformly over a subset of ndimensional Banach space with some p -norm. The hypervolume of a ball of radius r in an n-dimensional space is c p · r n for a constant c p that depends on the particular used p -norm, so if the maximum possible radius is R, we have
A straightforward solution would be to find a that maximizes directly. As and guessing advantage are correlated, it seems easier to first find a that maximizes the advantage, and then compute the corresponding . We get
which allows to find the optimal a for the given , that maximizes the quantity. For n = 1, this can be done using simple calculus, and it gives Pr post [X ] ≤ 1 1+(e r+1 · r) −1 for a = 1 + r. Now the problem is that a in turn depends on .
Recall that our goal is to achieve 1+(e r+1 · r) −1 we can express as follows:
To get r, we need to find a solution to an equation of the form x · e x = y. The solution is x = W (y), where W is so-called Lambert function. We get There is no closed form for W , but there exist good approximation methods for computing it. For example, we can use the iterative method of [6] : w 0 (y) = 1 w n+1 (y) = w n−1 (y) − w n−1 (y) · e wn(y) − y (w n (y) + 1) · e wn(y) .
For n > 1, it is easier to evaluate directly 
This gives Pr post [X ] ≤ ·e·r n n at the point a = n . Alternatively, we can compute optimal a for each univariate dimension separately, by first computing and then turning it into a = 1 + r, and combine as discussed in Sec. 4.2.
If c β (t) < 1, then we are done. In general, we can proceed and decrease β as much as we like. If c β (t) ≤ C for some constant C ≤ ∞. we need to take β ≤ . If there is no global upper bound on derivative sensitivity, we can see it as C = ∞, which gives β = 0 and results in infinite noise. In the latter case, there is still possibility that we can get finite noise, and a possible approach is to try out different values of C using window binary search and checking whether obtained β satisfies c β (t) ≤ C . This can be useful also if C < ∞, just to check if a better solution exists.
Since there are several parameters to optimize, we now describe a particular procedure of finding appropriate parameters.
-Let be the parameter we would get from -DP (i.e. for δ = 0).
-Let β and b be the optimal values for Cauchy noise, found using search over β as described in [10] . Note that these will not necessary be optimal for Laplace noise, but they give a fair starting point. -Assume that e − in GA formula is multiplied by some e −α ≤ 1. This means that, if would be the parameter we got for -DP, we would need = − α for ( , δ)-DP. This sets a constraint α ≤ . Now α ∈ [0, ] is a parameter that can be optimized.
-We need to find b such that 1 − -So far, α is a free parameter that can be optimized. We do it by searching through α ∈ [0, ]. -The noise level
